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Abstract This paper deals with the non-temporal use of the future in Italian known
as ‘epistemic’ or ‘presumptive’ (PF) in declaratives and interrogatives. We first
distinguish PF from epistemic necessity and possibility, as well as from weak
necessity modals, providing in the process the main empirical challenges PF raises.
We then propose and justify a semantic account that treats PF as a special normality
modal that involves a subjective likelihood component. Since in our account the
prejacent (the proposition in the scope of the modal) is at issue, the use of PF triggers
the implicature that the speaker is not in a position to appeal to what she knows in
order to support her commitment to the prejacent. This, we claim, is the source of
the intuition that PF is often used to offer a “guess” relative to the question under
discussion (QUD).
Keywords: epistemic future, presumptive future, normality modal, epistemic modality
1 Introduction
Languages use a variety of means to signal modulated epistemic commitment to
a proposition, such as epistemic modals (Gianni may/must be home), normality
modals (Gianni ought to be home), and likelihood expressions (Gianni is likely to
be home). In this paper, we provide an analysis of the non-temporal uses of the
future tense in Italian which have been argued to involve such modulated epistemic
commitment.
The future tense in Italian has an ordinary temporal use, exemplified in (1).
(1) Gianni
Gianni
sarà
will-be
a
at
casa
home
domani.
tomorrow
Gianni will be at home tomorrow.
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This morphological form also has a non-temporal use, called here the presumptive
future (PF), which allows co-occurrence with non-future temporal adverbs, exempli-
fied in (2) and (3). In such cases, the future acquires a “presumptive” or “epistemic”
reading.1
(2) Gianni
Gianni
sarà
will-be
a
at
casa
home
adesso.
now
Gianni is presumably home now.
(3) Gianni
Gianni
sarà
will-have
stato
been
a
at
casa
home
ieri.
yesterday
Gianni was presumably at home yesterday.
Because of the non-future adverbs, examples (2) and (3) can only receive a presump-
tive interpretation, according to which the speaker expresses her best guess with
respect to Gianni’s whereabouts.
As illustrated in (4) - (6), PF occurs in both polar and interrogative sentences as
well:
(4) Where is Gianni?
Sono
It-is
le
the
6.
6.
Sarà
Will-be
a
at
casa.
home
It’s 6 o’clock. He is presumably home.
(5) It’s 3am. Someone knocks at the door.
Chi
Who
sarà?
will-be
Who might it be?
(6) Gianni left this morning.
Sarà
Will-be
arrivato?
arrived
Might he have arrived?
Below we first differentiate PF from epistemic and weak necessity modals
(Sections 2 and 3). We then give our proposal in Section 4, and discuss PF in
interrogatives in Section 5; Section 6 concludes.
1 Other languages that have similar but not identical non-temporal uses of the future are French,
Spanish, Romanian, Dutch, Greek, and English. For earlier work see Falaus (2014), Falaus & Laca
(2014), Frana & Menèndez-Benito (2019), Frana & Menèndez-Benito (2015), Giannakidou & Mari
(2013), Irimia (2010), Mari (2010), Mihoc (2014), Mihoc, Bhadra & Falaus (2019), Winans (2016),
among others. We concentrate here on Italian, leaving a cross-linguistic comparison for another
occasion.
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2 PF is not an epistemic modal
In this section we show that PF must be distinguished from both epistemic necessity
and epistemic possibility.
PF is different from epistemic necessity It has been claimed in the literature (e.g.
Giannakidou & Mari (2013)) that PF has the semantics of a necessity epistemic
modal, like must in English and dovere in Italian. In this section we show that PF and
must/dovere differ in distribution and therefore must be distinguished analytically.
Note first that in (7), while a doctor could felicitously report her inference about
the patient’s health on the basis of the available evidence by using the epistemic
necessity modal must/dovere, an utterance with PF would sound odd.
(7) DOCTOR
Maria is at the doctor, who has reviewed her test results. She asks her doctor
what is wrong with her. The doctor replies:
a. Deve
Must
essere
be
narcolessia.
narcolepsy
It must be narcolpesy.
b. #Sarà
Will-be
narcolessia.
narcolepsy
It would be narcolepsy.
The intuition is that PF is inappropriate because it suggests that the doctor is making
a guess rather than an inference based on information she has.
The second case we consider is (8), modified from Mandelkern (2018). It shows
that when the speaker knows that the inference to been drawn is true, must/dovere is
acceptable, but PF is not.
(8) MATH
If the set of validities were decidable, then the halting problem would be
decidable. The halting problem is not decidable. So:
L’insieme
The-set
delle
of-the
formule
formulae
logicamente
logically
valide
valid
deve
must
essere
be
/#
/#
sarà
will-be
indecidibile.
undecidable
The set of validities must be undecidable.
Example (9) shows that unlike must/dovere, PF is acceptable in contexts where
the speaker has asserted complete ignorance concerning the question under discus-
sion.
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(9) IGNORANCE
Where is Maria?
a. Non
Not
ne
of-it
ho
have
la
the
più
most
pallida
faint
idea.
idea.
#Deve
#must
essere
be
a
at
casa.
home
I don’t have the faintest idea. #She must be at home.
b. Non
Not
ne
of-it
ho
have
la
the
più
most
pallida
faint
idea.
idea.
Sarà
will-be
a
at
casa.
home
I don’t have the faintest idea. She would be at home.
In (10) we see that must/dovere differs from PF in interrogatives as well.
(10) Someone knocks at the door in the middle of the night.
a. Chi
Who
sarà?
will-be
Who might it be?
b. ?Chi
Who
dev’essere?
must-be
Who must it be?
While the use of PF here is perfectly natural, the epistemic necessity modal is odd.
We have illustrated above both cases where epistemic necessity modals are
acceptable but PF is not, and the reverse. We turn now to a comparison with
possibility modals.
PF differs from epistemic possibility We show below that PF must be distin-
guished from the epistemic possibility modal might/potere. Example (11) shows that
when the speaker entertains multiple epistemic possibilities, she can report this by
using an epistemic possibility modal but not PF.
(11) MULTIPLE POSSIBILITIES
Where is Maria?
a. Sono
It’s
le
the
5.
5.
Potrebbe
Might
essere
be
a
at
casa
home
e
and
potrebbe
might
essere
be
al
at
lavoro.
work
It’s 5 o’clock. She might be at home and she might be at work.
b. Sono
It’s
le
the
5.
5.
#Sarà
Will-be
a
at
casa
home
e
and
sarà
will-be
al
at
lavoro.
work
It’s 5 o’clock. She will be at home and she will be at work
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Example (12) illustrates that when the speaker expresses high credence in the
prejacent, PF is appropriate, but the possibility modal is odd.
(12) BEST ALTERNATIVE
Where is Gianni?
a. Dove
Where
vuoi
want
che
that
sia!
be!
Sarà
Will-be
a
at
casa.
home
Where could he be! He would be home.
b. Dove
Where
vuoi
want
che
that
sia!
be!
#Potrebbe
Might
essere
be
a
at
casa.
home
Where could he be! #He might be home.
Based on the data discussed in this section, we conclude that PF is not an epistemic
necessity modal of the must/dovere kind, nor an epistemic possibility modal of
the might/potere type. Note also that these data challenge an analysis of PF as a
variable-force modal, proposed by Mari (2010), as well as an analysis of PF as a
mere likelihood modal. As for the former, if PF were a variable-force modal of the
kind described by Rullmann, Matthewson & Davis (2008) and Matthewson (2013),
one would expect it to be felicitous in contexts that allow epistemic possibility
modals as well as epistemic necessity modals. This, as we have seen, is not the case.
An analysis that treats PF as a likelihood modal can capture the fact that its force
is somewhat stronger than epistemic possibility (as in the BEST ALTERNATIVE and
MULTIPLE POSSIBILITIES scenarios), as well as the unacceptability of PF in the
MATH case. Crucially, however, a likelihood analysis cannot explain (i) why PF
is not appropriate in the DOCTOR scenario, a context in which, as (13) shows, a
likelihood modal is appropriate, and (ii) why PF is appropriate in the IGNORANCE
case, a context in which a likelihood modal is not felicitous, as shown in (14).
(13) DOCTOR
Maria is at the doctor, who has reviewed her test results. She asks her doctor
what is wrong with her. The doctor replies:
È
Is
probabile
probable
che
that
sia
be
narcolessia.
narcolepsy
It’s probably narcolpesy.
(14) IGNORANCE
Where is Maria?
Non
Not
ne
of-it
ho
have
la
the
più
most
pallida
faint
idea.
idea.
#È
#Is
probabile
probable
che
that
sia
be
a
at
casa.
home
463
Ippolito, Farkas
I don’t have the faintest idea. #She is probably at home.
We conclude that PF is not an epistemic modal, nor is it a variable-force or a
likelihood modal.
3 Similarities and differences between PF and weak necessity
The distribution of PF overlaps significantly with that of weak necessity modals,
namely should/ought to in English and dovrebbe in Italian. Thus, dovrebbe, just like
PF, sounds odd because unprofessional, in the DOCTOR example:
(15) Maria is at the doctor, who has reviewed her test results. She asks her doctor
what is wrong with her. The doctor replies:
#Dovrebbe
Should
essere
be
narcolessia.
narcolepsy
It should be narcolpesy.
Just like PF, dovrebbe is not acceptable in the MATH case, where p is taken to be
true:
(16) If the set of validities were decidable, then the halting problem would be
decidable. The halting problem is not decidable. So:
L’insieme
the-set
delle
of-the
formule
formulae
logicamente
logically
valide
valid
#dovrebbe
#should
essere
be
indecidibile.
undecidable.
The set of validities should be undecidable.
Finally, dovrebbe, just like PF, is appropriate in the IGNORANCE case but not in the
MULTIPLE POSSIBILITIES case:
(17) Where is Maria?
Non
Not
ne
of-it
ho
have
la
the
più
most
pallida
faint
idea.
idea.
Dovrebbe
Should
essere
be
a
at
casa.
home
I don’t have the faintest idea. She should be at home.
(18) Where is Maria?
Sono
It’s
le
the
5.
5.
#Dovrebbe
Should
essere
be
a
at
casa
home
e
and
dovrebbe
should
essere
be
al
at
lavoro.
work
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It’s 5 o’clock. She should be at home and she should be at work.
The weak necessity modal contrasts with PF, however, in the BEST ALTERNATIVE
case, where PF is fine but dovrebbe is not:
(19) Where is Gianni?
Dove
Where
vuoi
want
che
that
sia!
be!
Sarà
Will-be
a
at
casa.
home
Where could he be! He would be home.
Thus, PF but not dovrebbe, can be used to express the speaker’s ‘best guess’ con-
cerning the answer to the question under discussion (QUD).
Finally, PF differs from weak necessity in that it is incompatible with a counter-
factual prejacent:
(20) a. Dovrei
Should
essere
be
morta
dead
(ma
(but
non
not
lo
it
sono).
am)
I should be dead but I am not.
b. #Sarò
Will-be
morta
dead
(ma
(but
non
not
lo
it
sono).
am)
I will be dead (but I am not).
Given the data presented in the preceding two sections, the account of PF has to
capture its epistemic flavor without treating it as an epistemic modal. Furthermore,
it has to account for the similarities between PF and weak necessity modals while
also explaining their differences. We turn to this task in the next section.
4 Proposed analysis
Because of the similarity between PF and weak necessity modals our starting point
is Yalcin’s account of the latter. Yalcin (2016) proposes to treat the weak necessity
modals should/ought to as normality modals: α should F means that it would be
normal, all relevant things considered, for α to F. In this treatment, weak necessity
modals are not epistemic; their epistemic flavor is the result of a default inference
from what is normally the case to what is presumably the case (cf. Veltman (1996)).
In the account to be developed below, PF has a normality component which gives
rise to its epistemic flavor in the same way as in Yalcin’s proposal. The differences
between normality modals and PF are captured by imposing further requirements on
the latter.
Informally, our proposal is that a sentence of the form PF(p)/PF(p)? as-
serts/questions whether p is subjectively more likely than any of its contextually
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supplied alternatives, where likelihood is assessed based on what is normally the
case at the world and the time of evaluation for the speaker in declaratives, and the
addressee in interrogatives. This semantics is given formally in (21) for declaratives:
(21) [[PF pF ]]g,w,t,c is defined iff there is a unique q ∈ C s.t. ∀r: r ∈ C and
r 6= q [DOXi(w)∩q >N(i)(w)(t) DOXi(w)∩r]; if defined, p = the unique q
[∀r: r ∈ C and r 6= q [DOXi(w)∩q >N(i)(w)(t) DOXi(w)∩r]; where: (i) C
⊆ [[p]] f , and [[p]] f is the focus semantic value of the prejacent; (ii) i is a
variable contextually bound by the speaker in declaratives and the addressee
in interrogatives (iii) N(i)(w)(t) = {p ∈P(W): i believes that p is normally
the case in w at t}; (iv) for any propositions p,q ∈P(W): p >N(i)(w)(t) q iff
p is more likely than q w.r.t. what i believes is normally the case in w at t.
From these truth conditions it follows that in declaratives, the speaker’s commitment
to the prejacent is not based on knowledge but rather on her subjective assessment
of what is most likely, given what is normally the case. This explains the infelicity
of PF in the DOCTOR context: the patient expects the doctor to make a knowledge-
based claim. A PF utterance, however, is not such a claim, and therefore it will
be understood as communicating that the speaker is not in a position to make any
knowledge-based claims.
More generally, PF is predicted to be infelicitous in contexts in which the
prejacent is at issue and the speaker is in a position to make a knowledge-based
claim about it. This is so because a modalized statement relying on an epistemic
base is informationally more reliable than one that is constructed from a normality
base. Epistemic accessibility functions are reflexive and therefore w, the world
of evaluation, must be an element of the epistemic base given by such a function.
Normality accessibility functions are not reflexive, and therefore w is not necessarily
an element of a normality modal base: w may well turn out not to be a normal world.
This property makes normality bases informationally less reliable than epistemic
bases. The strongest normality based claim, N p, may be true in w without p being
true in w. Thus, under the assumption grounded in the Gricean maxim of Quality
that a cooperative speaker supports her statements on the most reliable information
available, if the speaker can support a claim based on an epistemic base, she should
do so, and if she does not, one concludes that such a base is not available to her. In
the DOCTOR scenario, it is pragmatically odd for the speaker to make a normality
based statement (with a weak necessity modal or PF) because, in that context, the
doctor is supposed to attempt to give a diagnosis on the basis of the medical facts that
she is aware of. There are, however, circumstances when guessing is appropriate,
such as in the following modified DOCTOR scenario:
(22) Our doctor is having a private informal conversation with another doctor,
who asks her what is the matter with Maria. She replies:
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Non
Not
mi
me
raccapezzo....
find-way....
Sarà
Will-be
narcolessia.
narcolepsy
I can’t figure it out... It could be narcolepsy.
In this scenario, the doctor is free to express her subjective guess since she is not
expected to provide an informed, professional opinion.
Note next that our account predicts that PF(p) is consistent with the speaker
having some evidence against p, as in (23):
(23) Where is Gianni?
Sarà
Will-be
in
in
ufficio,
office,
per
for
quanto
much
quando
when
l’ho
him-have
sentito
heard
al
at-the
telefono
phone
ieri
yesterday
mi
to-me
è
is
sembrato
seemed
malato.
sick
He will be at the office, even though when I heard from him on the phone
yesterday he sounded sick.
The infelicity of PF in the MATH scenario follows as well: conclusions in mathemat-
ical arguments have to be based on objectively true mathematical premises.
Note now that, according to (21), in order for the likelihood relation > to be
defined (avoiding trivially true or trivially false statements), both arguments of >
must be different from /0. In order to ensure this, it must be the case that p and all its
alternatives in C are compatible with DOXi(w). This explains the contrast between
PF and the weak necessity modal in (20). The crucial difference is that the weak
necessity modal has a simpler semantics that does not require its prejacent to be
compatible with DOXspeaker in declarative sentences. This point is confirmed by the
fact that asserting PF(p) does not rule out other doxastic alternatives, as shown in
the following variant of the IGNORANCE case.
(24) Who invited Maria to the movies? Carlo, Ezio, or Franco?
Non
Not
lo
it
so.
know.
L’avrà
Her-will-have
invitata
invited
Ezio.
Ezio
I don’t know. Ezio would have invited her.
Note, however, that it is odd to assert PF(p) immediately after raising the possibility
of a different alternative, as shown in (25).
(25) Who invited Maria to the movies? Carlo, Ezio, or Franco?
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#Potrebbe
It-might
essere
have
stato
been
Carlo,
Carlo,
ma
but
sarà
will-have
stato
been
Ezio.
Ezio
It might have been Carlo, but it will have been Ezio.
We suggest that (25) is odd because it is an odd pragmatic move to bring up a
possibility as a possible answer to a question only to then dismiss it immediately
afterwards. In support of this claim, note that (26), where (a) and (b) are uttered by
different discourse participants, shows that if the epistemic possibility is brought
up by one speaker, another speaker may use PF raising a different possibility while
agreeing that the first one is not excluded.
(26) Who invited Maria to the movies? Carlo, Ezio, or Franco?
a. Potrebbe
It-might
essere
have
stato
been
Carlo.
Carlo
It might have been Carlo.
b. Certo,
Sure,
potrebbe
might
essere
have
stato
been
Carlo,
Carlo,
ma
but
vedrai
you-will-see
che
that
sarà
will
stato
have-been
Ezio.
Ezio
Sure, it might have been Carlo, but you’ll see that it will have been Ezio.
Finally, note that our analysis accounts for the MULTIPLE POSSIBILITIES and BEST
ALTERNATIVE cases. In the former, PF is incompatible with the conjunction of
multiple possibilities because it requires the prejacent to be the likeliest alternative,
which ensures uniqueness. In the latter, PF is acceptable because the speaker’s claim-
ing that the prejacent is the most subjectively likely true answer to the QUD (given
what is normally the case) is compatible with the requirement that all alternatives be
doxastically possible.
4.1 What is at issue?
In our account, at the point that PF(p) is asserted, the QUD consists of p and its
alternatives in C. And yet, the speaker does not assert p, but rather, PF(p), which
amounts to claiming that according to what the speaker believes is normally the
case, p is the most likely alternative. A different analytical possibility would be to
assume that PF does not affect the semantic content of the sentence, and therefore
what is asserted is simply p; the contribution of PF would be to signal weakened
commitment to p. Under this account PF would be treated as a speech act modifier,
along the lines of the treatment of tag interrogatives and rising declaratives in Farkas
& Roelofsen (2017).
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The reasons that led us to take PF to contribute to the semantic content of the
sentence in which it occurs are the following. First, PF sentences may embed, as
exemplified in (27).2
(27) a. Immagino
Imagine
che
that
Carlo
Carlo
sarà
will-be
già
already
arrivato.
arrived
I imagine that Carlo would have already arrived.
b. Chi
That
lo
him
conosce
knows
crede/pensa/è certo/è convinto
believe/think/is
che
certain/is
Carlo
convinced
avrà
that
fatto
Carlo
carte
will-have
false
made
per
false
rivedere
cards
suo
to
figlio.
see-again his son
Those who know him believe/think/are certain/are convinced that Carlo
would have done all he could to see his son again
Second, the data in (28) show that agreeing with a sentence asserting PF(p) involves
agreeing with PF(p), and not just with p:
(28) a. Gianni
Gianni
sarà
will-be
a
at
casa.
home
Gianni will be home.
b. Sì,
Yes,
sono
am
d’accordo.
of-agreement.
Gianni
Gianni
sarà
will-be
a
at
casa.
home
Yes, I agree. Gianni will be at home.
c. Sì,
Yes,
sono
am
d’accordo.
of-agreement.
#Gianni
Gianni
è
is
a
at
casa.
home
lit: Yes, I agree. Gianni is at home.
Assuming that agreement involves committing to the semantic content of the inter-
locutor’s previous assertion, the data in (28) show that this content is PF(p), and not
just p. Similarly, (29) shows that in disagreeing with a previous PF(p) statement,
the speaker is not committing to ¬p but rather to ¬PF(p), which is why she may
explicitly commit to the possibility of p being true.
(29) a. Gianni
Gianni
sarà
will-be
a
at
casa.
home
Gianni will be at home.
2 The embedding potential of PF sentences is not completely free, as discussed in Mihoc et al. (2019).
Restrictions on the embedding potential of necessity and possibility modals have also been noted –
see, for example, Hacquard & Wellwood (2012), Anand & Hacquard (2013), Ippolito (2018)). Going
into the details on the limits of this freedom is beyond the scope of this paper.
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b. No,
No,
non
not
sono
am
d’accordo,
of-agreement.
anche
even
se
though
non
not
posso
can
escluderlo.
rule-it-out
No, I don’t agree, even though I can’t rule it out.
Finally, we turn to the question of whether the implicit i anchor in (21) is necessarily
bound by the speaker in unembedded PF declaratives. Frana & Menèndez-Benito
(2015) and Giannakidou & Mari (2013)) argue that it is. Frana and Menèndez-
Benito’s example, modelled after an example in Kratzer (2009), is given in (30):
(30) Filing Cabinet
None of us has had access to the information in this filing cabinet, but
we know that it contains the complete evidence (including possibly forged
evidence) about the murder of Philip Boyes and narrows down the set of
suspects. We are betting on who might have killed Boyes according to the
information in the filing cabinet.
a. Harriet: According to the information in the filing cabinet, I might have
killed him.
b. Harriet:
Harriet:
#Secondo
According-to
l’informazione
the-information
contenuta
contained
in
in
questo
this
archivio,
cabinet,
l’avrò
him-will-have
ucciso
killed
io.
I
lit: According to the information contained in this cabinet, I will have
killed him.
Note, however that the implicit anchor can be bound by the argument of according
to x in (31):
(31) Where is Gianni?
Non
Not
lo
it
so,
know,
ma
ma
secondo
according-to
sua
his
madre,
mother,
sarà
will-be
stato
been
trattenuto
kept
dal
from-the
direttore
director
in
in
ufficio.
office
I don’t know, but according to his mother, he must have been kept in the
office by his boss.
The difference between the unacceptable (30) and the acceptable (31) concerns, we
claim, the nature of the anchor: in (30) the anchor is non-agentive, and therefore
not able to assess the likelihood of a proposition, while in (31), it is agentive and
capable of such assessment. We therefore conclude that PF is not necessarily speaker
oriented.
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Based on the arguments in this section we conclude that PF contributes to the
semantic content of the sentence in which it occurs.
4.2 Interaction with negation
A possible challenge to the conclusion of the preceding subsection is the fact that PF
appears to necessarily be interpreted under the scope of negation:
(32) Non
Not
avrà
will-have
passato
passed
il
the
test.
test
(PF>neg, *neg>PF)
He must not have passed the test.
NOT: It is not the case that he must have passed the test.
In our account, the seeming impossibility of negation to take scope over PF is a
by-product of the existence presupposition triggered by PF. Recall that according
to (21), PF presupposes that there exists a unique alternative that is the most likely
alternative in C given what is normally the case. Because of this presupposition,
¬PF(p) is equivalent to PF(¬p). To see why, consider first the case in which the
set of alternatives is {p,¬p}. In this case, asserting that it is not the case that p
is the most likely alternative (given what is normally the case), the presupposition
that there is a most likely alternative entails that this most likely alternative is ¬p.
For cases where C contains more alternatives, the same result is reached, under the
assumption that the alternatives in C are mutually exclusive. For example, suppose
that the issue is Gianni’s whereabouts, and suppose that there are three possible
mutually exclusive alternatives {Gianni is at home, Gianni is at the office, Gianni is
at the gym} (or, in short, {home, office, gym}).
(33) Where is Gianni?
Sono
It-is
le
the
6.
6.
Non
Not
sarà
will-be
in
in
ufficio.
office
It’s 6 o’clock. He would not be at the office.
In (33), the speaker asserts that it is not the case that office is the most likely
alternative. Given the presupposition contributed by PF (that there is a most likely
alternative in C), it follows from ¬PF(office) that one of the other alternatives is the
most likely one. Since the alternatives are mutually exclusive, it follows that the most
likely alternative, whichever it might be, entails that not-office is true. In our account
then, ¬PF(p) and PF(¬p) are equivalent, and this equivalence is responsible for
the illusion of fixed scope relative to negation.
This concludes our discussion of PF in declaratives. We turn to interrogatives in
the next section.
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5 PF in interrogatives
We assume a semantics for interrogatives according to which the denotation of an
interrogative is the set of propositions that constitute its complete possible answers.
We exemplify schematically with the denotation of a polar interrogative PF sentence
in (34).
(34) [[PF(p)?]] = {[[PF(p)]],W \ [[PF(p)]]}
The positive answer to the interrogative commits its speaker to the proposition
PF(p), whereas the negative answer commits its speaker to ¬PF(p). This is illus-
trated in (35).
(35) a. Sarà
will-be
già
already
arrivato
arrived
Gianni?
Gianni
Will Gianni have arrived already?
b. Sì,
Yes,
sarà
will-be
già
already
arrivato.
arrived
Yes, he is presumably already arrived.
c. No,
No,
non
not
sarà
will-be
ancora
yet
arrivato.
arrived
No, he is presumably not arrived yet.
Note that the negative answer in (35) is understood obligatorily with narrow scope
negation for the reasons explained in section 4.2.
Following the literature on evidentials, such as Murray (2010), we assume that
the anchor of PF becomes the addressee in interrogatives via “interrogative flip”.
The account predicts that in a PF interrogative, the addressee is not assumed to know
the answer to the QUD. To see that this prediction is correct, compare the LACK OF
COMPETENCE case in (36) with the QUIZ case in (37).
(36) Two egyptologists have just discovered a sarcophagus. It contains a mummy.
One egyptologist says to the other:
Sarà
Will-be
un
a
uomo
man
or
or
una
a
donna?
woman
Would this be a man or a woman?
(37) Quiz show host to contestant:
#In
In
che
what
anno
year
sarà
will
stato
have-been
firmato
signed
il
the
trattato
treaty
di
of
Versailles?
Versailles
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In what year would the treaty of Versailles have been signed?
PF is acceptable in (36) because the addressee (one of the two egyptologists) is
not assumed to know whether the mummy is a man or a woman. In (37), on the
other hand, PF is inappropriate because in quiz contexts the addressee cannot be
assumed not to know the answer to the question. Note, however, that if the context
is as in (38), where the contestant has already proven his ignorance, the host’s PF
interrogative becomes acceptable:
(38) Host to contestant:
In
In
che
what
anno
year
è
is
stato
been
firmato
signed
il
the
trattato
treaty
di
of
Versailles?
Versailles
In what year was the treaty of Versailled signed?
Contestant remains silent
Host to contestnat:
Insomma,
Well,
su,
com’on,
cerchi
try
di
to
ragionare.
reason.
Sappiamo
We-know
che
that
seguì
it-followed
la
the
Prima
first
Guerra
war
Mondiale.
world.
Quindi,
Thus,
in
in
che
what
anno
year
sarà
will-have
stato
been
firmato
signed
il
the
trattato
treaty
di
of
Versailles?
Versailles
Com’on, think. We know that it followed World War I. So, in what year
would the treaty of Versailles have been signed?
Finally, (39) shows that in contexts in which the addressee is presupposed to know
whether the prejacent is true, PF is infelicitous:
(39) Maria is talking on the phone with her sister Anna who she hasn’t spoken to
in years.
#Avrai
Will-have
ancora
still
quelle
those
emicranie
migraines
che
that
ti
to-you
venivano
used-to-come
da
as
giovane?
young
Do you still have those migraines you had when you were young, I wonder.
The question in (39) becomes felicitous in situations where the addressee is absent
(as in a written communication). In this case, the question can be interpreted as
self-addressed, and PF is felicitous.
We conclude that the semantics of PF developed in Section 4 extends to inter-
rogatives without further modification.
473
Ippolito, Farkas
6 Conclusion and open issues
To summarize, we argued that PF in Italian contributes a normality base (a prop-
erty it shares with normality modals), a subjective likelihood component, and a
presupposition that plays a crucial role in accounting for discourse properties of
PF sentences, and for the interaction of PF with negation. We argued that what is
at issue when a PF sentence is uttered is the prejacent proposition. Since what is
at issue is the truth of the prejacent, the use of PF will trigger the implicature that
the speaker is not in a position to appeal to what she knows in order to support her
commitment to the prejacent. Hence, the observation that PF is often used to offer a
“guess” to answer the QUD. The proposed account covers PF in both declarative and
interrogative sentences, and predicts the possibility of its occurrence in embedded
contexts, though the constraints on embedded PF have not been explored here.
There are two further non-temporal uses of the future in Italian that have been
discussed in the literature (cf. Squartini (2012)). The first is its use in rejecting echo
exclamatives exemplified in (40a).
(40) a. A:
A:
Sei
you-are
stupido.
stupid.
B:
B:
Stupido
Stupid
sarai
will-be
tu!
you
A: You are stupid. B: You are the stupid one.
The second, more widely attested in other languages, is the future used in conces-
sives, exemplified in (41b):
(41) a. Gianni studied for days.
b. Avrà
Will-have
pure
also
studiato
studied
per
for
giorni,
days,
però
but
non
not
ha
has
comunque
anyways
passato
passed
l’esame.
the-exam
He might have studied for days, but he still failed the exam.
We leave to the future a discussion of whether and how these occurrences are
connected to the ones we have discussed in this paper.
Going beyond Italian, there are several important questions that remain open.
The first is whether one can find a principled explanation for why in Italian, as
well as in many other languages, it is the future tense that allows the presumptive
meaning we have investigated here. Answering this question will require one to
consider and compare existing theories of the temporal future (cf. Copley (2009),
Kaufmann (2005), Cariani & Santorio (2017) among others). The second question
concerns the differences among presumptive uses of the future cross-linguistically.
Finally, we leave open the question of how PF compares with particles such as wohl
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in German or darou in Japanese, which have similar though not identical effects.
Common to all these forms is that they are used as means of nuancing commitment
to the prejacent. As such, the question of connections with evidential systems also
arises. Accounting for the non-temporal use of the future in a particular language,
as we have done above, provides, we hope, the basis for future explorations of the
semantics of PF across languages.
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